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HIERARCHY, FORMAL PRINCIPLES, AND A NON-
POSITIVISTIC CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Comments on Gabriel Encinas’ ‘Interlegal Balancing’ 
Wei Feng (Beijing/Kiel) 
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in the Seminar of Gabriel Encinas, 
organized by Sant’ Anna, and further to have the opportunity to publish my comments 
on the topic of ‘interlegal balancing’. What is more, since I’m not very familiar with 
Italian research or legal practice in related domains, my comments will mainly be based 
on general legal theory on the one hand and on developments both in Germany and 
elsewhere in the European countries on the other hand. 
Frankly speaking, I agree with Gabriel Encinas on many points, especially the 
structural-theoretical framework of principles theory as well as the possible application 
of the method of balancing in multi-level legal orders. Besides, Encinas’ extensive reply 
gives me further chance to learn more about what he calls ‘inter-legality’ and the 
implicated methods. Still, I have some divergent opinions on certain details. 
1. Hierarchy and Legal Order 
Encinas distinguishes between four positions of multi-level legal 
communities, including the radical pluralism, the moderate pluralism, the moderate 
constitutionalism, and the radical constitutionalism. The first two positions contain no 
hierarchy, while the latter two positions construct themselves hierarchically. 
Furthermore, only the second and the third positions allow balancing, which is 
                                               
 Lecturer at the China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing, once as teaching postdoctoral 
researcher at the Renmin University of China, Beijing (2015-2020), also working on a further doctoral 
project at the Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Germany. I should like to thank Stanley L. Paulson 
for suggestions and advice on matters of English style. 
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‘interlegal’. (Encinas: 11) One can observe immediately an interesting point, that is, a 
moderate pluralism containing no hierarchy and, simultaneously, allowing balancing. 
My first doubt is, however, whether a legal order without hierarchy is 
conceptually possible. What ‘hierarchy (Stufenbau)’ means in Hans Kelsen is only the 
formal aspect of empowerment– that is, a content-independent context – between 
different levels of the legal order.1 The contents of rules found on different levels, 
respectively, could be left untouched, even though it is also possible to have restrictions 
on the content of lower-level rules, which is a contingent matter. 2  The conflicts 
between the contents of lower-level norms and those of higher-level norms could be 
resolved only by means of some competent organ, either some kind of ‘constitutional 
court’ or empowerment accorded to the state’s leaders personally.3 Furthermore, we 
can read similar opinions by Kelsen on conflicts between national and international 
laws,4 which would be helpful for understanding the current topic of multi-level legal 
orders. 
Nevertheless, Encinas seems to have a different reading of Kelsen, when he 
says that the radical constitutionalism may disavow ‘the real dimension of law, 
represented by popular sovereignty as democracy and self-determination.’ He adds, 
‘Kelsen’s monism belongs here.’ (Encinas: 20) On the contrary, the hierarchy 
(concerning the municipal or national legal community) and monism (concerning 
multi-level legal communities) in Kelsen’s sense does not necessarily implicate the 
                                               
1 See Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Einleirung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, 1st edn. 
(Leipzig and Vienna: Franz Deuticke 1934); repr. as Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Studienausgabe 
der 1. Auflage 1934, ed. Matthias Jestaedt (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2008), at 74, 107; and its translation 
in English, see Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, trans. Bonnie Litschewski 
Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992), at 63, 91. 
2 See Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (n 1), at 63, 65. 
3 Ibid at 71-5. 
4 Ibid at 117-9. 
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direct disavowal of some rules with significant contents or values,5 such as those of 
democracy or with respect to human rights.6 
One may argue that there is no legal order at all in a radical pluralistic 
community, either national, international or supranational.7 As Encinas puts it, ‘[t]he 
genus proximum of pluralism is individuated from constitutionalism by its disavowal 
or denial of hierarchy between overlapping legal order.’ (Encinas: 19) It would be the 
case when the hierarchy may well be understood in other ways, say, substantively. Even 
though, this understanding is not necessary, especially not in Kelsen’s sense anymore. 
Regarding cases of pluralism, be it ‘radical’ or ‘moderate’, there could still be some 
formal aspect of law to form a hierarchy, which eventually constructs a multi-level legal 
order or orders. The only controversy is whether and to what extent this ‘inter-legal 
hierarchy’ would or not have an impact on the contents of multi-level legal order(s) 
respectively. 
It is more problematic when one asks what brings about a change in pluralism 
from a ‘radical’ one into a ‘moderate’ one, if the latter still contains no hierarchy, but, 
simultaneously, endorses the procedure of ‘inter-legal balancing’. (Encinas: 11 and 19) 
Actually, the assumed inter-legal balancing would probably, through the results of 
                                               
5 Ibid at 71-5, 117-9. According to Martin Borowski’s research, the ‘hierarchy of conditions’ – initiated 
by Kelsen’s Schüler Adolf Julius Merkl and then received by Kelsen himself – ought to be strictly 
distinguished from the ‘hierarchy of derogation’ as common understood. See Martin Borowski, ‘Sein 
und Sollen am unteren Ende des Stufenbaus der Rechtsordnung’, in Michael Anderheiden et al. (eds.), 
Verfassungsvoraussetzungen. Gedächtnisschrift für Winfried Brugger (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2013) 
183-201, at 200-1; his ‘Concretized Norm and Sanction qua Fact in the Vienna School’s Stufenbaulehre’ 
27 Ratio Juris (2014) 79-93, at 80, 89-90; and his ‘Legal Pluralism in the European Union’, in Agustín 
José Menéndez and John Erik Fossum (eds.), Law and Democracy in Neil MacCormick’s Legal and 
Political Theory. The Post-Sovereign Constellation (Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York: 
Springer 2011) 185-209, at 190. 
6 Otherwise, if these cases of disavowal really took place, an appropriate solution would be the famous 
Radbruch formula. See Gustav Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und Übergesetzliches Recht’, 
Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 1 (1946) 105-8, at 107, repr. in Gustav Radbruch, Gesamtausgabe 
(Collected Works) 20 vols, Arthur Kaufmann (ed.), vol. 3: Rechtsphilosophie III, Winfried Hassemer 
(ed.) (Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1990) 83-93, 282-91 (editor’s notes), at 88. See the English-language 
translation, ‘Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law’, trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and 
Stanley L. Paulson, 26 OJLS (2006) 1-11, at 7. For the discussion of the possible connection of Hans 
Kelsen’s theory of ‘basic norm’ to Radbruch’s formula, see Robert Alexy, ‘Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory 
in the System of Non-Positivism’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 163 (2020) 31-44, 
at 43-4. 
7 I should also like to thank Prof. Gianluigi Palombella for his immediate response on this point. 
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balancing, lead to the hierarchy in Kelsen’s formal sense. According to Encinas’ 
taxonomy, it ends up as a ‘moderate constitutionalism’. However, if the procedures of 
inter-legal balancing never produce any definitive rules to eventually form some kind 
of hierarchy, say, only in order to keep the shape of a ‘moderate pluralism’ as described 
by Encinas, then one may wonder what those procedures of inter-legal balancing are 
meant to do. 
2. Qualifying Criteria of (Inter)Legality and Non-Positivism 
It is also illuminating that Encinas apply the distinction between classifying 
and qualifying connections between law and morality, which has been introduced by 
Robert Alexy,8 and also the application of the criteria of legality or inter-legality. 
(Encinas: 22 and below) 
Curiosity compels me to ask a further question, namely, whether the qualifying 
criteria of legality necessarily imply or at any rate suggest an inclusive non-positivistic 
understanding 9  of inter-legal order and its ‘inter-legality’. If so, what role does 
balancing play in this non-positivistic inter-legal order? This question is correlated with 
my third question below. 
3. Models of Balancing Concerning Formal Principles 
To be frank, Encinas’ final section on balancing and formal principles are of 
special interest to me. Encinas expresses, however, an ambivalent attitude towards the 
model of balancing where formal principles are concerned, especially with respect to 
                                               
8 See Robert Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts (Freiburg & Munich: Karl Alber 1992), at 48-9; and 
its English translation as Robert Alexy, The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism, trans. 
Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002), at 26. 
9 See Robert Alexy, ‘The Dual Nature of Law’, in IVR 24th World Congress Papers Plenary Sessions 
(Beijing 2009) 257-274, repr. in 23 Ratio Juris (2010) 167-82, at 176-7. For the European Union Law in 
particular, Borowski, ‘Legal Pluralism in the European Union’ (n 5), at 202-8. 
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the separation model of balancing competences, as set out by Jan-R. Sieckmann10 or 
the ‘two-level-model’ introduced by Matthias Klatt and Johannes Schmidt.11 (Encinas: 
28-9) It seems to me that he may also want to accept another model of combination, 
that by Martin Borowski12 (Encinas: 29, footnote 138), which stands in a sharp conflict 
with the models defended by Sieckmann as well as by Klatt and Schmidt. 
Both Sieckmann’s and Klatt and Schmidt’s models begin with the balancing 
of competences or, more exactly, of the formal principles that lie behind each 
competence norm. My first doubt is that they correspond not to the proper conflict 
situations that arise between legal principles, but rather the classical conflict situation 
between legal rules or between different levels in the hierarchy of law, e.g. lex superior 
derogat legi inferiori. 13  Nevertheless, according to the definitions introduced by 
Robert Alexy, principles are optimization requirements, while rules are definitive 
requirements.14 In this sense, competence norms are always definitive requirements, 
that is to say, they are legal rules, not legal principles. Although this understanding of 
competence is not fully clear in Alexy’s book A Theory of Constitutional Law,15 one 
can find, in Alexy’s article on ‘Alf Ross’ Concept of Competence’, that in the end he 
                                               
10 See Jan Sieckmann, Recht als normatives System. Die Prinzipientheorie des Rechts (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos 2009), at 200-4. 
11 Matthias Klatt and Johannes Schmidt, Spielräume im Öffentlichen Recht. Zur Abwägungslehre der 
Prinzipientheorie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2010), at 65 and below; Klatt and Schmidt, ‘Epistemic 
Discretion in Constitutional Law’, 10 I · CON (2012) 69-105, at 99 and below; Matthias Klatt, Die 
praktische Konkordanz von Kompetenzen. Entwickelt anhand der Jurisdiktionskonflikte im europäischen 
Grundrechtsschutz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2014) at 156-273; and his ‘Balancing Competences: How 
Institutional Cosmopolitanism Can Manage Jurisdictional Conflicts’, 4 Global Constitutionalism (2015) 
195-226. 
12 See Martin Borowski, ‘The Structure of Formal Principles – Robert Alexy’s “Law of Combination”’, 
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 119 (2010) 19-35. 
13 At first glance, this assessment of models by Sieckmann and also by Klatt and Schmidt might sound 
astonishing, since Klatt e.g. tries to construct conflicts of competences exactly as ‘conflicts of formal 
principles’, other than ‘conflicts of rules’. See Klatt, ‘Balancing Competences’ (n 11), at 211. What is 
decisive, however, is the role of formal principles in the model of balancing itself, considering substantial 
principles altogether. 
14 Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1985), at 75-6, trans. Julian Rivers as 
A Theory of Constitutional Rights with a ‘Postscript’ (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), at 47-8. 
15 Nevertheless, it is to mention that Alexy gives those constitutive legal rules the name as ‘competence 
norms’. See Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Law (n 14), at 153. 
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defines the competence norms as ‘meta-rules’ vis-à-vis behavioral norms.16 Therefore, 
competences as rules do not lend themselves to balancing.  
My second doubt is that even the principles behind the competence norms, that 
is, the so-called ‘formal principles’, cannot be balanced directly with each other. Both 
Sieckmann’s and Klatt and Schmidt’s models of direct balancing between formal 
principles are then categorized as ‘separation models’.17 To this extent, they are based 
on a different conception of ‘formal principle’ as that introduced by Alexy,18 even if 
not a theoretically impossible construction. 
On the contrary, according to Alexy’s conception, a principle takes precedence 
over a rule only if this principle could be stronger than the substantial principle together 
with the so-called ‘validity principle’ behind the rule; this latter principle ‘requires the 
satisfying of rules and in this sense supports [this rule – added by the author] 
formally’.19 It is then labeled by Martin Borowski as the ‘model of combination’20 or 
later by Alexy as a more subtle ‘epistemic model’.21 Accordingly, there should be, 
firstly, at least two substantial principles engaged in the balancing and, secondly, some 
formal principles are to come into play. Actually, Alexy also develops an ‘epistemic 
law of balancing’.  It concerns the theory of constitutional rights, which says: ‘The 
more intensive an interference in a constitutional right [understood as substantial 
principle – added by the author] is, the greater must be the certainty of its underlying 
                                               
16 Robert Alexy, ‘Alf Ross’ Begriff der Kompetenz, in Andreas Hoyer et al (eds.), Gedächtnisschrift für 
Jörn Eckert (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2008) 43-64, at 63; and its translation into Chinese, trans. Wei Feng, 
129 Journal of Comparative Law, No. 5 (2013) 145-160, at 160. 
17 Robert Alexy, ‘Formal Principles. Some Replies to Critics’, 12 I · CON (2014) 511-24, at 522. 
18 This is especially apparent in the work of Matthias Klatt and Johannes Schmidt, when they argue that 
‘contrary to Alexy’s position, the so-called formal principles are not relevant in order to establish the 
nature and the scope of epistemic discretion. For formal principles concern only question of competence, 
whereas epistemic discretion arises just at the level of material principles.’ See Klatt and Schmidt, 
‘Epistemic Discretion in Constitutional Law’ (n 11), at 71. Somewhat later, Klatt directly equates 
competences and formal principles when he says that ‘competences are a specific kind of principles, 
namely formal principles.’ See Klatt, ‘Balancing Competences’ (n 11), at 211. 
19 Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (n 14), at 48, footnote 24. (emphasis original) 
20 Borowski, ‘The Structure of Formal Principles’ (n 12) 19-35. 
21 Alexy, ‘Formal Principles’ (n 17), at 520; see also Martin Borowski, ‘Alexys drittes Modell formeller 
Prinzipien’, in Martin Borowski et al. (eds.), Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie. Robert Alexys 
System (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2017) 449-76. 
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premises.’22 The two models claimed, respectively, by Borowski and by Alexy differ 
from each other mainly on the details of ‘combination’ of formal and substantial 
principles, which cannot be discussed here. 
Concerning the situation of ‘inter-legal balancing’, the competent authority of 
one legal order would claim to have competence over the exclusive, final decision 
without considerations of the competent authorities of other legal orders. The latter may 
contest the competence of the former, speaking on behalf of their own competences. So 
far, there is no discretion with respect to balancing between competences, or between 
the formal principles lying behind them. Only when the latter argue further on the basis 
of certain substantial principles, e.g. requirements of fundamental rights or human 
rights, can there be discretion for balancing by the respective authorities. One may take 
the recent judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Court concerning European 
Central Bank as an example, which, along with various discussions on competence 
issues, emphasizes that ‘the principle of proportionality requires that the programme’s 
monetary policy objective and the economic policy effects be identified, weighed and 
balanced against one another.’23 Therefore, what is decisive is the balancing between 
substantial principles lying behind the corresponding legal rules, while the competence 
norms and the formal principles lying behind them would be able to function only in 
combination with those substantial principles or, more subtlely, function with an eye to 
the epistemic certainty of the premises of substantial principles. 
4. Excursus: Competence Rules and Formal Principles 
In his concise reply, however, Encinas improves his clearer attitude towards 
the possible models of formal principles, which compels me to make necessary 
clarifications as excursus. 
                                               
22 Alexy, ‘Postscript’ to A Theory of Constitutional Rights (n 14), at 419. 
23 BVerfG, Judgement on 5 May 2020, at 2 and 76-7. 
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4.1.  Competences are Rules, But Cannot Lend Themselves to 
Balancing Directly 
As stated above, I have tried to explicate that competence norms are rules, 
other than principles. Although before that, I mentioned the possibility of apply the 
classical rules of conflicting to solve the concordance of competences. My main 
concern is and will still be, however, the more accurate understanding of the character 
of competence norms,24 which should be considered seriously in reconstructing the 
model of balancing concerning formal principles. To this extent, I do mean that this 
process of balancing cannot be reconstructed as direct conflict between competence 
norms – if so, then the only way were to apply the classical rules of conflicting. 
Otherwise, it would be contradictory to my above understanding of Kelsen’s notion of 
hierarchy. 
4.2.  Formal Principles and Where to Find Them? 
Another recurring controversy is whether the epistemic certainty of the 
premises of substantial principles – being represented by the reliability operators – are 
equal to the formal principles themselves. If not, and nor are they equal to competence 
norms, as emphasized above, then where to find them? This is the last myth of formal 
principles, which can only be answered, however, after full scrutiny of all the possible 
formulations, functions and construction models of formal principles.25 
Only concerning current context, I need to add immediately, that I never try to 
cut off the ‘ties’ between formal principles and competence norms, understood as rules. 
Based on those understandings above, one can trace back to Alexy’s discussions on 
                                               
24 I would like to mention, besides Alf Ross and Robert Alexy, also my dear colleague Gonzalo Villa 
Rosas, who is also cited by Encinas in his reply. See Gonzalo Villa Rosas, ‘Commanding and Defining. 
On Eugenio Bulygin’s Theory of Legal Power-Conferring Rules’, Crítica 49 (2017) 75-105. 
25  See e.g. Wei Feng, ‘Formelle Prinzipien: ihre Formulierungen, Definitionen, Konstruktionen’, 
presented at the doctorate colloquium by Prof. Martin Borowski, Ruprecht Karl University of Heidelberg, 
06. Sept. 2016 (unpublished). 
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competence norms in his book A Theory of Constitutional Law. In the scope of certain 
competence norm, the authorized subject has the corresponding discretion (Spielraum), 
so that he or she can fulfill the requirement of competence norm definitively with any 
measurement that falls under his or her discretion. What is more, according to Alexy, 
the division of competence, e.g. which between the constitutional court and the 
legislature, is not quite that easy to be solved through rules of conflicting. As Alexy 
puts it, ‘there is no simple rule which definitively delimits the prognosis competence 
of the legislature and that of the constitutional court in all cases.’26 Competence as 
meta- or constitutive rules are definitive and, at the same time, they let some legal rights 
or obligations, either prima facie or definitive, to be possible or, more accurately, 
potential. To this extent, competences do have relation to substantive contents, since 
they construct discretions referring to the contents of legal rights or obligations. It is 
then the function of formal principles, which ‘lie behind competences’ and provide 
reasons or justifications for those discretions. 
We do not need to be annoying or even disappointed and to abandon formal 
principles if we only find the reliability operators being presented in the so-called 
‘weight formula’. Formal principles need not and cannot ‘show up’ directly in the first-
order balancing, rather mainly in the second-order balancing according to the 
‘epistemic model’, which has been elaborated by Alexy relative later.27 
5. Open Question: A Non-Positivistic Constitutionalism? 
Finally, I would like to shed light on Encinas’ usage of qualifying criteria of 
(inter)legality, as mentioned above, in relation to the formal principles. Balancing is 
deemed to be a real challenge for the hierarchical model of the legal order, either 
national or international. Even when the hierarchy is formally understood, it can only 
                                               
26 Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Law (n 14), at 313. 
27 See Alexy, ‘Formal Principles’ (n 17), at 520-2. 
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allow the definitive rules to be recognized, but not principles.28 However, it is formal 
principles that, through their epistemic role in the procedure of balancing between 
substantial principles, construct a relation between rules in hierarchy and other 
substantial principles without hierarchy.29 It turns out to be a non-positivistic picture 
containing both ‘pluralistic’ and ‘constitutional’ elements, since substantial principles 
are necessarily incorporated into the legal order, even though the formally hierarchical 
aspect is still reserved. Some authors may suspect that the universal balancing 
procedure or proportionality review leads eventually to the ‘constitutional adjudicative 
state’ or to ‘over-constitutionalisation’.30 Nevertheless, only a mistaken understanding 
of ‘hierarchy’ and that of ‘formal principles’ might bring this about. 
                                               
28 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP 1977), at 36-45; see H. L. 
A. Hart, ‘Postscript’ to his The Concept of Law (first publ. 1961), 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford UP 1994), at 
263-8. 
29 Related research is rare. However, see Borowski ‘Concretized Norm and Sanction qua Fact in the 
Vienna School’s Stufenbaulehre’ (n. 5), 90, footnote 27; and his ‘Legal Pluralism in the European 
Union’, 202-8. For the discussion in China, see Wei Feng, ‘Can There Be a Legal System? – From 
Axiomatics through Order of Values to Model of Principles’ (in simplified Chinese), 1 Journal of 
Soochow University: Legal Studies, No. 1 (2014) 34-48, repr. in China Social Science Excellence: 
Jurisprudence and History of Law, No. 7 (2014) 47-65, at 59-60. 
30  Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen. Zur gegenwärtigen Lage der 
Grundrechtsdogmatik’, Der Staat (1990) 1-31, at 21-6, repr. in his Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Shrkamp 1991), at 190-7. 
